Abstract-There is an emerging consensus that the nation's electricity grid is vulnerable to cyber attacks. This vulnerability arises from the increasing reliance on using remote measurements, transmitting them over legacy data networks to system operators who make critical decisions based on available data.
I. INTRODUCTION Cybersecurity of critical infrastructures in general, and the electricity grid in particular, is a subject of increasing research interest [1] , [2] . The economic consequences of successful cyberattacks on the electricity grid are potentially staggering. Energy Management Systems [EMS] are ubiquitous in electric grid operations and present potential targets for cyberattacks. These systems are based on SCADA [Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition] hardware and software components and are used to supervise, control, optimize, and manage electricity generation and transmission systems. As the grid evolves, legacy SCADA systems will co-exist and interoperate with new components [ 978-1-4673-2729-9/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE [6] . Tomorrow's Smart Grid will incorporate increased sensing, communication, and distributed control to accommodate renewable generation, EV [Electric Vehicle] loads, storage, and many other technologies. This substantial increase in actionable data transfers will make the Smart Grid more vulnerable to cyber attacks and is, in turn, driving the urgency of cybersecurity research for electricity grids.
An important class of cyber attacks are data integrity attacks. These consist of a set of compromised sensors (ex: power meters, relays) whose readings are altered by the attacker. Much of the research on data integrity attacks in power systems has been on studying taxonomy, developing detection algorithms, and devising various countermeasures. In particular, many recent papers have explored various aspects of data integrity attacks on SCADAIEMS systems that impact the key function of state estimation. These include computation and characterization of the attacks, and various detection and mitigation strategies based on secure PMU placement [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] .
Data integrity attacks are of consequence only when the system operator reacts to the compromised data and is misled into taking uneconomical or even catastrophic decisions. There is some research on analysing integrity attacks in the context of subsequent operator actions. A detailed two-year study by Sandia [12] investigated the possible impacts of cyber attack on grid control systems using novel cyber-to-physical (C2P) bridge concepts. However, there is little work (to our knowledge) on quantifying the consequences of data integrity attacks. This is the essential focus of our work, and it is important in order to prioritize the adoption of cyber security countermeasures including PMU placement, encryption, hardware upgrades, and advanced detection algorithms. In this paper, we devise metrics to assess the economic impact of data integrity attacks under operator re-dispatch decisions based on optimal power flow methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II we summarize key results on unobservable attacks and their countermeasures, and in Section III we survey grid operations under normal and contingency conditions. Following this, in Section IV we present an example that illustrates consequences of unobservable attacks in the context of operator actions. Section V contains our main results: metrics to assess the economic impact of unobservable attacks using optimal power flow methods. We illustrate our method using empirical studies in Section VI, and then draw conclusions and close with a discussion of future research directions.
II. UNOBSERVABLE ATTACKS
Data integrity attacks whose compromised meter readings are consistent with the physical power flow constraints are called unobservable [11] . Unobservable attacks require coordination -compromised meter readings must be carefully orchestrated to fall on a low dimensional manifold in order for the attack to be unobservable. Unobservable attacks will pass any bad data detection algorithm. As a consequence, unobservable attacks can cause significant errors in state estimation. In [13] , we address sparse unobservable attacks which involve the compromise of a modest number of meters. Specifically, we offer efficient algorithms to find all unobservable attacks involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of power meters on lines. Applying these algorithms to a synthetic 2383 bus power system, we identify 685 possible unobservable attacks that involve the compromise of 4 or fewer meters [13] . Other examples produce similar statistics. The conclusion is inescapable: common power systems are vulnerable to a large number of unobservable data integrity attacks.
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) have recently attracted a great deal of interest in the context of cyber security applications. The driving hypothesis is that PMUs are networked on the modem NASPInet architecture which is designed for security. We can thus assume that PMU measurements are a priori known to be secure [14] . Emami and Abur [15] have shown that with the introduction of a few extra PMUs, bad data detection and identification capabilities of EMS systems can be dramatically improved. Known secure PMU placement problems have been studied by Bobba et al. [16] who have investigated heuristic algorithms for mitigation of unobservable data integrity attacks. In [13] we have developed a method to resist such attacks while maintaining the robustness and reliability of the system. In our work [13] , we have shown that p + 1 PMUs are sufficient to thwart a collection of p unobservable attacks and we offer an algorithm to determine their placement. While these countermeasure strategies using known-secure PMU's are effective, they are extremely expensive because of the number of possible attacks that require defense in realistic power systems.
Given limited resources for protection against cyber attacks, it becomes necessary to quantitatively prioritize investments. There are two components to this prioritization: (a) determining prior probabilities that an attack occurs in some event horizon, and (b) assessing the economic consequences of operator decisions that are taken after an attack occurs. The first component could be developed on the basis of assessing component security (ex: is encryption used, how secure is the installation). This paper focusses on the second component: quantifying the economic consequences of data integrity attacks. More precisely, the operator schedules generation to meet load to minimize some economic cost function J subject to various constraints (ex: line limits, generator ramping and rate constraints, N -1 security constraints). In the pre-2 attack state, the cost function has value JO. In the postattack state, the operator is misled into believing that loads have changed, and that the current generation schedule is no longer economically optimal. As a result, the cost function is again minimized using the (compromised) load data, which leads to a (possibly) larger cost i', The increase in cost i3.J == Jl -JO is the attack consequence metric we develop in this paper. Interestingly, a decrease in cost i3.J indicates that a constraint violation will occur. In this paper, a decrease indicates a violation of the thermal limits of a power line, however, in other contexts this could indicate a violation in a security constraint, such as N -1.
III. GRID OPERATIONS
Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) are responsible for reliable operation of the electric power system in a region. They dispatch generation, schedule for economic advantage, identify equipment outages, redirect power to manage congestion, coordinate with the neighbouring areas, facilitate effective markets, and promote infrastructure expansion. In order to maintain system reliability with equal treatment of all market entities, these organizations are independent of utilities or other market participants [17] .
Control centers are designed to assist system operators take decisions. Advanced software and visualization tools are used to provide the operator with the timeliest and most accurate grid data. System operators follow a set of operating procedures that establish criteria for actions during particular events.
A. Data
Grid operators rely on an enormous amount of real time and historical grid information. The ISO monitors data from the buses and substations in the region to maintain reliable operations and determine what energy source will be the most economical for any given location at any given time. The grid data available includes, at minimum, the apparent, real and reactive power, voltage, current and frequency at every bus and line terminal, and the power flows that each transmission line is carrying. Operators constantly monitor critical system parameters, on numerous computer display screens. Data arrives at the SCADAIEMS master stations from numerous Remote Terminal Units (RTU) that collect field data from substations and other remote power system locations.
B. Software Tools
Automated modelling tools give the operator a comprehensive view of the grid and how it evolves from dynamic occurrences. A state estimator analyses real-time conditions of the grid. Tens of thousands of data points from the power grid are fed into computer algorithms to develop a series of contingency analyses for potential events that could compromise system reliability so that the operator knows how the grid evolves in real time. As an example the Midwest ISO state estimator collect data from 30,000 buses and 87,000 control points every 30 seconds [18] . Video projection systems, alarming display systems show real-time power-grid data from thousands of endpoints that assist the operator in decision-making to ensure safety and reliability of the transmission system. Power flow models describe the physics of the system and include real and reactive power, voltage angles and magnitudes. They are used to check the feasibility of a dispatch and to optimize real and reactive power dispatch. Other important software tools are load forecasting, unit dispatch and economic commitment, voltage and transient stability analysis, intermittent and renewable resources modeling. Each ISO has information about day-ahead real time markets through tools like the real time market look ahead and the day-ahead market to schedule generation with lengthy start-up times.
C. Dispatch Under Contingency
When faced with unexpected circumstances, the power system operator first relies upon automated control sequences programmed into the numerous levels of system dynamic control. The automation is intended to rescue the power system network from an unexpected contingency that occurs faster than a human can respond. After the automated control sequences achieve a new stable system operating point, the operating personnel step in with pre-defined manual operating procedure intervention. The system operator necessarily coordinates with system operators of other portions of the interconnected network to coordinate restructuring the overall power system network to the desired configuration.
D. Data Integrity Attacks
Power system data can be compromised. The attack can take place at the analog measurement level or during digital transmission through the communications circuits. Signals can be compromised at the generation or substation level. The physical quantities can be changed so that the sensing tool measures unreliable or corrupted data. For example, voltage or current can be modified before being measured. The corrupted data is then transmitted to the RTU in the field and then the control room. If the data alteration is done wisely it can pass the bad data detection algorithms and is provided to the operator as if it were reliable. He/she acts consequently and, given the fact that the real grid conditions are different from the corrupted information, potentially serious grid problems can be generated. In the same way breaker and relay status can be altered. Another means to compromise the signals that the SCADA master receives consists in disturbing the data format while on travel. The communication channel from the substation to the control room could be fiber optics, telephone wire, radio frequency or the message might be carried by the power line.
In the next section we give a concrete example of how a data integrity attack forces the operator to take dispatch decisions that have serious consequences on the power grid. IV. AN EXAMPLE As discus sed above, grid operators critic ally rely on data in their decision making processes. Compromised data can lead to economically sub-optimal dispatch choices, congestion, and even failures of transmission lines. In this section we offer a simple example that illustrates the damage that can be induced by data integrity attacks through misinformed operator decisions.
Consider an unobservable attack in which exactly two power injection meters and the line connecting the two buses are compromised [13] . The connecting line T is a cutset of the power system graph. Loads £1 and £2 are served by power generated by G 1 and G 2 . Generator G 1 and load £1 are in the same island, while G 2 and £2 are in a second island. These islands are connected by the tie-line T which has a thermal 10adability limit of 200 MW. Generations and loads have real power meters that transmit their readings over a SCADA network to the system operator. Power flow on the tie-line is not metered. The situation we consider is illustrated in Figure 1 .
The relevant pre-attack operating conditions are:
• This attack is unobservable as the compromised meters readings are entirely consistent with the standard DC load flow model. The operator perceives this attack as corresponding to an unanticipated reduction in load at £1, and a simultaneous increase in load at £2' Let us assume generation at G 2 is substantially less expensive than at G 1 . In response to this load change, the operator may choose to reduce generation at G 1 and increase it at G 2 to serve the new (compromised) load conditions most economically. 2The DCOPF does not need this constraint, as the constant L, can replace the li variable everywhere in the formulation. However, we include this as a constraint as it allows us to compute the shadow price of the load and measure the consequence of a data integrity attack at the loads.
In this section we discuss an analytical approach to measuring the consequence of the unobservable attacks discussed in [13] . Assessment of consequences is important when resource limitations do not allow full deployment of countermeasures to cover all unobservable attacks. To measure consequence, we consider the OC Optimal Power Flow (OCOPF) as a model of operator behavior and operator response to data integrity attacks. More formally, the OCOPF used in this paper is stated as follows 1 :
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the solution to the OCOPF and a(x) to denote the value of variable x in solution a.
In this section we consider 3-sparse attacks [13] where an attacker may falsify demand information such that net demand remains constant. For example, given buses i and j with demand li and lj, the attack, A~(i, j), may falsify the demands as li +~and lj -~, for some value~.
The linear program solution to the OCOPF provides important insight into the sensitivity of the power system to data integrity attacks. In the solution, the shadow price (dual variable) of the constraints measures how the objective function changes in response to a change to the righthandside of the constraints. In this context, the shadow price measures the economic impact to the system when demapd data is falsified. Given a shadow price on li, denoted by li and an attack of size~, the economic impact of A~(i, j) is calculated as
The second piece of information in the solution is the range of the righthand side for which a shadow price is valid. The boundaries of the range are the points where a constraint becomes tight or loose. In the physical system, it represents the point where the operator will change its behavior. More importantly, perhaps, within this range, the variation, p, of all decision variables can be described with a single linear function.
For the load constraints (3), we denote the upper and lower bounds of the shadow prices range as r: and i , respectively.
The shadow price range is only valid for a single variation of a constraint's righthandside, however, there exists a conservative bound for simultaneous variations. As long as the sum of all the ratios of righthandside deviation to max deviations is :S 
A. Operator Response
To compute the p for each decision variable during attack
As (i , j), we choose a 6i that falls within the shadow price range and compute the solution to a new OCOPF, as:
where B is the set of all buses in the power system, li is the load served at bus i and gi is the generation at bus i.
c; is the cost to produce power at bus i. Gi and c; are the minimum and maximum generation at bus i. L, is the amount of electric power demanded by bus i. 0i is the phase angle at bus i. bi,j is the susceptance between buses i and j and Qi,j is the capacity between buses i and j. Equation 1 provides the objective function, which minimizes the cost of generation. Equation 2 constrains the generation to be within operating limits. Equation 3 ensures the specified amount of load is served at each bus.? We do not allow load shedding in this model, as a data integrity attack that indicates a shedding requirement to the operator would likely invoke a different response protocol than is assumed here. However, it is possible to incorporate load shedding by changing constraint 3 into an inequality constraint and adding the cost of shedding to the objective function. Equation 4 ensures conservation of flow at each bus. Equation 5 constrains the amount of flow on each line in the network. For simplicity, we denote the flow on a line i, j as Ii,j == bi,j (Oi -OJ). We also use a to denote It is therefore apparent that this attack has misled the operator into a re-dispatch decision that overloads (and possibly damages) the tie-line. In this example, we could also reasonably assume that power-flow on the tie-line is metered in the SCAOA network. In this case, we note that the attacker would have to simultaneously compromise three meters (L 1 , L 2 , T) to keep the attack unobservable. If the attack becomes observable, bad data detection algorithms run by the system operator would produce warning flags and intervene in any re-dispatch operations. We stress that the consequences of this data integrity attack occurs only after the operator responds to the compromised data. 
B. System Response
The system response to actions taken by the operator is computed using the following DCOPF, a'IjJ: 5 Fig. 2 . Impact of data integrity attacks at buses 7 and 8 on the cost to produce power.
Thus, the system remains feasible if ViV j
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In short, if at (~-,~+) the system remains feasible, it will remain feasible throughout the shadow price range. This process can be repeatedly calculated by finding new shadow prices at the boundaries.
VI. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
In order to evaluate shadow prices as a consequence measure we consider two different case studies. The cases adopt the 24 bus IEEE RTS-79 problem [19] . The fuel types for each generator are discussed in [20] . Based on these fuel types, costs are calculated based on reference [21] . These numbers are reported in Table I . In the case of multiple generators at a bus, without loss of generality, we average cost weighted by generation capacity.
In this model there is one unobservable 3-attack based on the approach by [13] . This attack occurs at buses 7 and 8 and the power line between them. Bus 7 has generation with maximum capacity 300 MW and a cost of $300 per MWH. There is no generation at Bus 8. Bus 7 has 125 MW of load and bus 8 has 171 MW of load. The power line between 7 and 8 has capacity 175 MVA. Given that generation at bus 7 is expensive and there is enough load at bus 7 and capacity between 7 and 8 to accommodate all of 7's generation it is not expected that a data integrity attack on the loads at 7 and 8 will have much impact. However, we must analytically determine Fig. 3 . The shadow price for data integrity attacks at buses 7 and 8. this. The shadow price on the loads for both 7 and 8 is $300, as the only unused generation has cost $300. The shadow price range for the load at bus 7 is (-9, 30) and at bus 8 is (-171, 13). The change in price (as a % of the original price) is plotted in Figure 2 . Here it can be seen that even beyond that range, the price of generation does not change (generation isA shif~ed from one $300 generator to another $300 generator as li == lj). Thus, in order to find a consequence we resolve the DCOPF at each of these boundaries, and recompute the shadow prices and ranges. Once we have done this successive times, as seen in Figure 2 , we see economic consequences. Finally, Figure  3 plots the rate of change (shadow price) for attacks of sizẽ == ±500. Transitions in both plots indicate where attacks cause generation of different costs to be swapped.
This model provides an example of a low impact data integrity attack. The attacker has to launch a substational data integrity deviation (> 300 MW) in order to achieve any changes in the price for power' and is unable to have a physical impact to the system within the range provided.
We next consider a variation of the RTS-79 that constrains the network in the region of buses 7 and 8 to present a case where the shadow prices detect larger consequences. Bus 7's 3Indeed, this level of load deviation may raise red flags in other parts of the security system, as it requires of the loads to report negative power demands. Fig. 4 . Impact of data integrity attacks at buses 7 and 8 on the cost to produce power under constrained conditions. generation capacity is increased to 400 MW and its generation cost is dropped to $1. The shadow price on the load at bus 7 is now $1 as it can obtain up to 100MW of additional power from the generator at bus 7. The shadow price for the load at bus 8 is $300 as the power line from 7 to 8 is congested, so it can only obtain generation from other parts of the network. The shadow price ranges for the loads at bus 7 and 8 are (-4, 100) and (-6, 330), respectively. Given the differences in shadow prices, there is now an immediate economic impact for a data integrity attack (Figures 4 and 5) . In addition, in this model, a(f7,S) == 175 and p(f7,S) == 1. Thus, within these shadow price ranges, a physical violation will be observed. This effect is seen in Figure 6 , which plots the amount of flow that violates thermal limits on a line as t5 is varied. This is not unlike the example seen earlier in Figure 1 .
Intuitively the physical violation occurs when the data integrity attack increases load at bus 7 (decreasing load at bus 8). This causes the operator to think it can cheaply dispatch generation at bus 7 to satisfy the extra load at bus 7. As this extra load does not actually exist, the excess generation is shipped on the already saturated line (7, 8) , causing an overload. In this case, the consequence does not go beyond the physical damage to the line. Even if the line were to fail, there is enough available generation and capacity in this system to fully satisfy all loads without this line. However, this will not be the case in general.
In short, given a DCOPF model of operator behavior, the shadow prices and shadow price ranges of unobservable attack vectors are a reasonable mechanism for determining the consequence of an attack. The key contribution of this result is to show that under linear response models, physical changes and violations in a system under data integrity attacks can be determined analytically by iteratively calculating the shadow prices and their ranges. Though we focus on the DCOPF, the techniques described here can be generalized to other models of operator behavior, especially linear models. It remains for future work to show how to use these measurements to prioritize the deployment of countermeasures. Possible approaches include worst-case consequence within a specified range of data integrity attacks or minimum attack that causes a physical Impact of data integrity attacks at buses 7 and 8 on physical constraints. problem in the system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Recent years have seen increased interest in a desire to understand the vulnerabilities of electric power grids to cyber attacks. Indeed, recent work by [13] has shown that it is possible for an attacker to falsify information sent to the grid operator so that the incorrect information remains consistent with other measurements reported to the operator. However, though a power grid may contain a large number of possible unobservable data integrity attack vectors, it is clear that they are not all equal in possible severity. This paper has shown that under the linear DC dispatch model of grid operations, shadow pricing information can be used to assess the economic and physical impacts of data integrity attacks to power systems. The approach is straightforward, can be adopted by many existing operations models, is a necessary step for assessing the consequences of attacks discovered by [13] , and, to the best of our knowledge, no one has suggested the use of shadow prices in this way.
Though this paper has demonstrated how shadow price information can be used to measure the consequence of data integrity attacks, there remain a number of interesting directions for future work. First, this paper has focused on data integrity attacks related to metering information (the amount of load demanded by parts of the power grid). There are other types of data integrity attacks that need to be considered, including the on/off status of a power lines (either from direct measurements or state estimation [22] , [23] , [24] ), the output of generators, the states of control devices, etc. Second, this work needs to be extended to sparse attacks of size greater than 3. Third, additional work needs to be done to turn the shadow price measurements into a methodology for prioritizing the deployment of countermeasures, such as PMU place or hardware upgrades. For example, we could posit a prioritization based on a certain level of attack and ranking based on consequence severity within that threshold. Or we could rank by minimum attack that violates physical constraints in the system. Finally, it will be important to develop analytical methods for assessing consequence in nonlinear operations models, as many of the important possible physical problems (such as voltage and frequency) only occur in such models.
